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Abstract
This article provides the beginning neuroeconomist with an introductory overview to the different methods
used in human neuroscience. It describes basic strengths and weaknesses of each technique, points to
examples of how each technique has been used in neuroeconomic studies, and provides key tutorial references
that contain more detailed information. In addition to this overview, the article presents a framework that
organizes human neuroscience methods functionally, according to whether they provide tests of the
association between brain activity and cognition or behavior, or whether they test the necessity or the sufficiency
of brain activity for cognition and behavior. This framework demonstrates the utility of a multimethod
research approach, because converging evidence from tests of association, necessity, and sufficiency provides
the strongest inference regarding brain–behavior relationships. Set against this goal of converging evidence,
human neuroscience studies in neuroeconomics currently rely far too heavily on methods that test
association, most notably functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI).
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Abstract
This article provides the beginning neuroeconomist with an introductory overview to the different
methods used in human neuroscience. It describes basic strengths and weaknesses of each
technique, points to examples of how each technique has been used in neuroeconomic studies, and
provides key tutorial references that contain more detailed information. In addition to this
overview, the article presents a framework that organizes human neuroscience methods
functionally, according to whether they provide tests of the association between brain activity and
cognition or behavior, or whether they test the necessity or the sufficiency of brain activity for
cognition and behavior. This framework demonstrates the utility of a multi-method research
approach, since converging evidence from tests of association, necessity and sufficiency provides
the strongest inference regarding brain-behavior relationships. Set against this goal of converging
evidence, human neuroscience studies in neuroeconomics currently rely far too heavily on
methods that test association, most notably functional MRI.
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A challenge to doing research in interdisciplinary fields like neuroeconomics is becoming
skilled in the sheer diversity of methods used by the different parent fields. Ideally, a
neuroeconomist would have some working knowledge of the analytical tools used by choice
theorists, the analytical tools used by computational modelers, experimental design in
psychology and economics, statistical techniques ranging from those used in neuroimaging
to those used in the analysis of behavior, and the full suite of neuroscience methods
available for investigating cognition. A truly comprehensive primer on methods would have
to be book-length to cover each of these topics in detail.
The goal of this review is much more modest: to provide an introductory overview of one
set of items in the neuroeconomist's toolkit, the methods of cognitive neuroscience. This
overview is intended for people who are new to the field and who have very little, if any,
knowledge of cognitive neuroscience techniques. It is intended as a starting point for
beginning students and researchers, not as the last word. Since many techniques are
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summarized in a small space, no one method can be covered in great detail. Rather, only the
basics of each method are discussed, and interested readers are directed to key tutorial
references for each technique for more detailed information. In addition to these references,
beginning researchers will also want to consult one of several good methodology textbooks
(e.g., Senior, Russell, & Gazzaniga, 2006; Toga & Mazziotta, 2002).
Given the constraints of space, this review is limited to only those neuroscience methods
that can be used in human subjects. This excludes a great chunk of important research in
neuroeconomics that uses non-human animals as subjects. However, this focus accords with
a likely audience for this review: researchers in psychology, economics or business who
work with human subjects and are curious about incorporating neuroscience data in their
research.
In addition to introducing the techniques of cognitive neuroscience, this review also tries to
answer two broad questions about methodology in neuroeconomics. First, given the plethora
of neuroscience techniques available, what kind of methodological approach should research
in neuroeconomics take? While several introductions to the field recommend a multi-method
approach (Camerer, 2007; Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2004; Camerer, Loewenstein, &
Prelec, 2005), this overview emphasizes a particular strength of using multiple methods.
Neuroscience methods differ according to the type of inference they provide concerning the
relationship between brain and behavior. Broadly, methods can test the association between
brain activity and behavior, the necessity of brain activity for behavior, or the sufficiency of
brain activity for behavior. The most solid claims about brain-behavior relationships are
based on converging evidence from these three kinds of tests. Neuroeconomic research
programs would therefore do well to employ a combination of methods that can address
questions of association, necessity and sufficiency.
Second, given the strengths of a multi-method approach, does current research in
neuroeconomics actually use this approach? Two sources of data are consulted to quantify
what methods are currently being used in the field. These data suggest that, at this early
stage, the field as a whole falls short of its stated goal to gather converging evidence from
multiple methodologies. The vast majority of studies to-date rely on tests of association,
with most of these using a single technique – functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI). While fMRI has several important strengths that justify its widespread use,
neuroeconomic research programs would be strengthened by greater inclusion of
complementary techniques that can address the inferential limitations of fMRI.
What kind of methodological approach should research in neuroeconomics
use?
The cognitive neuroscience toolkit is just that—a set of tools. A logical way to organize any
set of tools is according to their function. This introductory overview therefore organizes
human neuroscience methods functionally, according to the kinds of inferences each method
provides about brain-behavior relationships. This organization differs from the canonical
presentation of cognitive neuroscience methods, which emphasizes the spatial and temporal
resolution of each technique (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1988). The motivation for the
current framework arises from answering the question, “What kind of methodological
approach should research in neuroeconomics use?” Or, in other words, “What different
kinds of evidence should we gather to allow the strongest inferences about brain function?”
This discussion takes it as given that some neuroeconomists are interested in building
theories about the relationship between the brain and cognition or behavior. Of course, some
economists and experimental psychologists are only interested in neuroscience findings and
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techniques inasmuch as these can inform theories of cognition or of human economic
behavior. The question of how neuroscience research can inform theories in economics and
psychology is an important one, which has been extensively debated (Camerer, et al., 2005;
Glimcher, 2010; Gul & Pesendorfer, 2008; Harrison, 2008; McCabe, 2008). However, the
methodological framework and methods overview below stress the role of each technique in
elucidating brain-behavior relationships. The concluding section returns to the question of
how neuroscience methods, and the knowledge of brain-behavior relationships gained
through them, can inform theories in economics and psychology.
So, what different kinds of evidence combine to make the strongest inferences regarding the
mappings between brain systems and cognitive functions or behaviors? To answer this
question, we can examine the evidence underlying neuroscience claims that have achieved
the status of broad agreement. Below, two such claims are considered. Both are routinely
taught in introductory neuroscience lectures. Both were initially tested in animal models.
One concerns the relationship between a specific brain region and a specific cognitive
function, while the other concerns the relationship between a specific neurochemical system
and a specific kind of social behavior.
As a first example, take the statement that “Area MT (or V5) subserves visual motion
perception.” This claim is often taught in introductory lectures on the visual system, and MT
is often used as a paradigmatic example of specialization in cortical organization. What is
the evidence that MT is important for motion perception?
This claim has been most systematically tested in the model system of the Rhesus macaque
(Macaca mulatta) monkey (for a detailed review, see Newsome, 1997; Parker & Newsome,
1998). (MT is so named because of its “middle temporal” location in this animal.) Single
neurons in MT fire action potentials when motion is present at a particular retinotopic
location. This response is strongest when the motion is in a particular direction, and falls off
as the direction of motion deviates from the “preferred” direction of that neuron. For
example, an MT neuron might respond most when rightward motion is presented and least
when leftward motion is presented. You can calculate how well a neuron's responses
distinguish between two different directions of motion, and many neurons match or exceed
the sensitivity of the animal to differences in motion direction. When discriminating
between motion directions is difficult, so that the animal makes different responses to
repetitions of the same stimulus, the activity of MT neurons predicts which decision the
animal will make. Neurons with similar preferred directions are located next to each other in
MT, and stimulating a group of MT neurons biases a monkey's perception of motion
direction towards the preferred direction of those neurons. Lesions of MT impair motion
perception, without affecting other aspects of visual perception.
As a second example, take the statement that “the neuropeptides oxytocin and vasopressin
play a critical role in affiliative behavior.” Again, students often learn this in an introductory
behavioral neuroscience class. What is the evidence that oxytocin and vasopression are
important for affiliative behavior?
This claim has been most systematically tested in the model systems of the prairie and
montane voles (for a detailed review, see Insel & Fernald, 2004; Insel & Young, 2001). The
prairie vole (Microtus ochrogaster) and montane vole (Microtus montanus) are both small
rodent species found in central and western North America. Despite many similarities
between the species, prairie voles and montane voles differ dramatically in mating behavior.
Prairie voles form monogamous breeding pairs, with a male and female sharing parental
care of their offspring. In contrast, montane voles mate promiscuously, and male montane
voles are not involved in the care of their offspring. The expression of oxytocin and
Kable Page 3













vasopression receptors differs dramatically in the two species. Oxytocin receptors are
densely expressed in the nucleus accumbens of female prairie voles, and vasopression
receptors are densely expressed in the ventral pallidum of male prairie voles. In montane
voles, there is not a similar expression of oxytocin or vasopression receptors. In prairie
voles, injections of oxytocin (for females) or vasopressin (for males) increase affiliative
behavior towards one's mating partner. The act of mating has a similar effect on affiliative
behavior in prairie voles, and injecting drugs that block oxytocin (for females) or
vasopressin (for males) receptors block this effect of mating. By overexpressing the
vasopressin receptor in the ventral pallidum, male montane voles can be genetically
engineered to respond to vasopression in the same manner as male prairie voles do.
What can we learn from these two examples? In both cases, we see the combined use of
three broad kinds of evidence (Sarter, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 1996; Silva, 2007).i First,
there are tests of association. These involve observing or experimentally manipulating
psychological states or behavior, simultaneously measuring neural activity, and examining
the correlation between the two.ii In probabilistic terms, tests of association mostly focus on
the probability of a neural state (φ) given a psychological state (ψ), P(φ | ψ), though in some
cases the analysis shifts this focus to the probability of a psychological state given a neural
state, P(ψ | φ). Examples of tests of association include the correlation between neuronal
activity in MT and the direction of motion perceived by the subject, and the correlation
between receptor expression and mating behavior across prairie and montane voles.
Second, there are tests of necessity. These involve disrupting neural activity and showing
that this manipulation impairs a specific behavioral or psychological function. In
probabilistic terms, tests of necessity reduce the probability of a neural state and see how
this changes the probability of a psychological state, P(Δψ | ↓φ).iii Examples include the
impairment in motion discrimination caused by lesions to MT, and the reduction in
affiliative behavior caused by oxytocin and vasopression antagonists.
Third, there are tests of sufficiency. These involve enhancing neural activity and showing
that this manipulation results in a specific behavioral or psychological state. In probabilistic
terms, tests of sufficiency increase the probability of a neural state and see how this changes
the probability of a psychological state, P(Δψ | ↑φ). Examples include the changes in motion
perception induced by microstimulation of MT, and the increase in affiliative behavior
induced by oxytocin and vasopression agonists.
As illustrated by the two case studies above, successful research programs in neuroscience
employ a multi-method approach that combines tests of association, necessity and
sufficiency. This combination provides strong evidence for the causal influence of neural
iThe framework used here borrows from Silva (2007) and Sarter, Berntson and Cacioppo (1996). Silva's (2007) “Convergent Four”
hypothesis argues that the strongest way to test a hypothesis concerning the connection between two phenomena is to gather
converging evidence from theoretical work and three different kinds of experiments: non-intervention (here called association),
negative alteration (necessity) and positive alteration (sufficiency). In their comment on functional imaging techniques, Sarter,
Berntson and Cacioppo (1996) distinguish between the ability of neuroimaging to test P(φ | ψ) and the ability of other techniques to
test P(ψ | φ).
iiDespite the name, tests of association can in some cases provide causal evidence (Weber & Thompson-Schill, 2010), depending on
the particulars of the experiment. For example, neuroimaging experiments typically control the stimuli presented to the subjects and
measure the subject's responses and brain activity. At one end of the spectrum, when examining the relationship between stimuli and
brain activity, causal inference is clearly warranted. At the other, when examining the neural activity linked to different behavioral
responses to the same stimuli, causal inference is clearly not warranted. Note that the causal inference provided is only ever about how
changes in the environment or psychological states cause changes in brain activity, while tests of necessity and sufficiency are
interested in the opposite direction of causality.
iiiTechnically, the probabilistic framework is not concerned with causality, and it does not matter whether the change in neural state is
due to an experimental manipulation or is simply observed. The only distinction is between P(φ | ψ) and P(ψ | φ), so P(ψ | φ), P(Δψ |
↓φ) and P(Δψ | ↑φ) are formally the same. The important point to emphasize is that tests of association are often of P(φ | ψ), while
tests of necessity and sufficiency are of P(ψ | φ).
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states on psychological states. In tests of association, neural activity is measured, while in
tests of necessity and sufficiency, neural activity is manipulated. The first kind of test
establishes an important precondition for causality, that occurrences of the respective neural
and psychological states are correlated. The second and third tests then test causality
directly, by establishing whether the neural states are necessary and sufficient conditions for
the psychological states.
What neuroscience methods provide which kinds of inference?
This methodological framework – distinguishing between tests of association, necessity and
sufficiency – provides a way to functionally organize the methods of human neuroscience
(see Tables 1 and 2). Table 1 uses this framework to categorize methods that link regional
neural activity to mental function. Table 2 similarly categorizes methods that link
neurochemical systems to mental function. The following sections provide a brief
description of each technique listed in Tables 1 and 2, organized by the categories used in
these tables. For each technique, tutorial references dedicated to that technique are listed,
which the interested reader should consult for additional information.
Methods for linking regional neural activity to mental function
Tests of association between regional neural activity and mental function
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI): Functional MRI is the most widely
used method in neuroeconomics, and in cognitive neuroscience more generally (for more
information on fMRI, see Bandettini, 2009a, 2009b; Huettel, Song, & McCarthy, 2004;
Jezzard, Matthews, & Smith, 2001). Like all MRI, fMRI involves measurements made with
an MRI scanner. MRI scanners have a large static magnetic field. For a typical research
scanner with a field strength of 3 Tesla, the field is 60,000 times the strength of the earth's
gravity. Signals based on the properties of nuclear magnetic resonance are then measured by
making small, local modulations in the strength of this field. In fMRI, the dominant source
of these signals comes from protons in water molecules. Different kinds of MR images have
different contrasts—that is, they are sensitive to different properties of the measured tissue.
The kind of contrast used in most fMRI is referred to as T2* contrast (“T-2-star,” so named
in comparison to T1 or T2 contrast, both of which are used in anatomical imaging). T2* is
sensitive to, amongst other things, the oxygenation level of the blood. This is because
deoxygenated hemoglobin has magnetic properties, and therefore causes local susceptibility
effects that decrease T2* contrast. Oxygenated hemoglobin does not have magnetic
properties. Since local increases in neural activity are associated with increases in cerebral
blood flow, and these increases in blood flow are associated with increases in blood
oxygenation, local increases in neural activity are associated with increases in the fMRI
signal. This fMRI signal is commonly referred to as the blood oxygenation level dependent,
or BOLD, signal.
BOLD fMRI has several advantages that make it a preferred technique in human
neuroscience. Although many methods measure correlates of neural activity non-invasively
in humans, fMRI provides the best combination of spatiotemporal resolution and anatomical
coverage. Functional MRI provides a simultaneous measurement of neural activity across
almost the entire brain, including sub-cortical regions (the exceptions being a few regions
hampered by technical signal-dropout artifacts, such as orbitofrontal cortex and the temporal
pole (Ojemann, et al., 1997; Weiskopf, Hutton, Josephs, & Deichmann, 2006)). This whole-
brain coverage is achieved at a high spatial resolution (typically 3 mm) and at a good
temporal resolution (typically a measurement every 2 s). On the practical side, many
institutions have MRI scanners and the technical expertise necessary to run them, and
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several good software options for analyzing fMRI data are freely available, which lowers the
practical barriers to starting an fMRI research project.
The basic analysis of fMRI data involves comparing BOLD activity under two different
conditions, with this statistical comparison usually being performed independently at each
spatial location. By designing the right set of comparisons between stimuli or tasks, one can
ask questions about where regional brain activity is associated with different mental
functions.
Because fMRI has good spatiotemporal resolution and the possibility for many repeated
trials, more sophisticated experimental designs and analyses are also possible. Parametric
designs look for BOLD activity that changes with parametric variations in stimuli or task
variables, rather than categorical changes, which can strengthen inferences regarding the
causes of neural activity (Aguirre & D'Esposito, 1999; Buchel, Wise, Mummery, Poline, &
Friston, 1996). Model-based fMRI (O'Doherty, Hampton, & Kim, 2007) builds on
parametric designs, by testing for activity that is correlated with parametrically varying
hidden variables that are estimated in a statistical model of the subject's task behavior. Both
parametric and model-based fMRI designs identify not just where neural activity changes,
but also how activity in these regions changes with experimental variables. Adaptation and
repetition suppression designs (Grill-Spector & Malach, 2001; Henson & Rugg, 2003;
Weigelt, Muckli, & Kohler, 2008) capitalize on the finding that repeated stimuli are
associated with reduced BOLD activity, using this effect to ask what stimuli are treated as
the same in a given neural population. Multivariate techniques such as pattern classification
(Haynes & Rees, 2006; Norman, Polyn, Detre, & Haxby, 2006) ask how the spatial pattern
of neural activity changes under different conditions. Both adaptation and pattern
classification techniques tap into neural coding at the sub-voxel level, and by testing what
stimuli a region can distinguish between and which it cannot distinguish, these techniques
show how information is encoded in that region. Finally, other statistical techniques have
been used to test for interactions (“functional” or “effective” connectivity) between different
brain regions, using the correlations or coherences between timeseries, and how those
interactions change with experimental manipulations (Friston, 1994; Friston, et al., 1997;
McIntosh, Bookstein, Haxby, & Grady, 1996; Sun, Miller, & D'Esposito, 2004). All of these
designs and analyses go beyond localization, or a simple mapping of the regional brain
activity associated with specific stimuli or tasks, to ask more detailed and textured questions
about how brain activity is related to mental activity.
Functional MRI does have both theoretical and practical limitations. Perhaps the most
important theoretical limitation is the source of the fMRI signal. The BOLD signal reflects
mass activity across the more than one million neurons in a voxel, and may be more closely
linked to changes in synaptic conductances than neuronal spiking (Logothetis, 2008;
Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, & Oeltermann, 2001). This means that the signal cannot
easily distinguish bottom-up versus top-down signals or neuromodulatory versus other
inputs (Logothetis, 2008). The BOLD signal does not provide information about neural
dynamics that occur at a fast time scale, and may be insensitive to other neural dynamics as
well. Practically, the requirement of being in an MRI scanner constrains the kind of
experiments that are possible. For example, experiments that require any head movement or
large body movements are not possible. There are also restrictions on the kinds of subjects
that can be tested. Subjects who are contraindicated for MRI (e.g., have metal in their body)
or those who cannot lie motionless in a relatively small space (e.g., young children,
claustrophobics) cannot be tested. Functional MRI is also more expensive than behavioral
testing or several of the other techniques discussed below.
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Positron Emission Tomography (PET): PET predates fMRI as a technique for non-
invasively mapping changes in cerebral blood flow (for more information on PET, see
Raichle, 1998). In PET, a radioactive tracer is injected into the blood stream. For
measurements of cerebral blood flow, [15O] water is used. The decay of this tracer in the
brain is then measured. This radioactive decay involves the creation of positrons, and these
positrons are quickly annihilated when they react with nearby electrons, thereby creating
two photons that leave the point of annihilation in exactly opposite directions. PET scanners
are designed to detect the coincident arrival of these photon pairs. The location of their
origin, and thus the point of radioactive decay, can then be estimated from these
measurements. In the case of [15O] water, differences in the amount of radioactive decay
across regions indicate differences in cerebral blood flow.
With the development of fMRI, the use of PET in cognitive neuroscience has waned.
Functional MRI offers several advantages over PET. Functional MRI does not involve
radioactivity, which restricts the number of measurements you can make in a given subject.
Functional MRI also offers better spatial (3 mm vs. 1 cm) and temporal (2 s vs. 1 min)
resolution. A typical PET study involves 1-2 measurements per subject per condition, with
each measurement reflecting neural activity averaged over one minute. This restriction
limits the kind of designs that can be used in PET compared to fMRI; for example, “event-
related” designs are not possible with PET. In addition, fMRI is less expensive and more
widely available than PET.
There is still a role for PET, however. In particular, PET can measure blood flow in absolute
terms (mL/g/min), while BOLD fMRI only provides a relative measure. Absolute measures
of blood flow permit comparisons across subjects, across sessions, and across brain regions.
PET can also measure quantities other than blood flow. For example, other tracers can be
used to measure cerebral metabolism (Fox & Raichle, 1986), or, as discussed below,
different components of specific neurotransmitter systems (Zald, et al., 2004).
Electroencephalography (EEG): Aside from lesion studies, EEG is one of the oldest
human neuroscience techniques (for more information on this technique, see Handy, 2005;
Luck, 2005). In EEG, electrodes are placed on the scalp to measure electrical changes that
result from brain activity. All neuronal signaling is electrochemical, and electrical signals
within neurons are accompanied by simultaneous extracellular changes. These electrical
signals can propagate through the brain and skull and be detected on the scalp. The size of
these signals at the scalp is very small, 10-100 μV, an order of magnitude smaller than at
their source.
Classically in EEG studies, the time-locked responses to many repetitions of a stimulus are
averaged. The spatial and temporal profile of this average response, called the event-related
potential or ERP, is then investigated. More recent statistical techniques have focused on
decomposing the ERP so that varying responses on single trials can be investigated
(Debener, Ullsperger, Siegel, & Engel, 2006). In addition to the ERP, EEG can also be used
to measure changes in oscillatory activity that accompany task performance.
One of the advantages of EEG is great temporal resolution (<1 ms). This allows
investigations of the timing and evolution of neural activity at the timescale at which
cognition occurs. It also permits studies of neural signals that occur at a very fast time scale,
such as synchronized or oscillatory activity. Another advantage is that EEG is less expensive
and more widely available than fMRI. The EEG setup also places fewer constraints on
experimental design (e.g., no loud noises or restricting subjects' movement) and can be
altered to be portable, so that measurements could be taken outside of a laboratory.
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An important disadvantage of EEG is that it cannot spatially localize activity in the manner
that fMRI or PET can. This is because of the “inverse problem” (Michel, et al., 2004). EEG
measures electric potentials at the scalp, and the question of what configuration of brain
sources could have led to the observed data is an ill-posed problem – an infinite number of
different configurations are possible in principle. Thus, calculating an inverse solution is
only possible by making certain assumptions, and the validity of this inverse solution is
complicated to test. Recent efforts have focused on developing new statistical techniques for
calculating the inverse solution, developing new hardware such as dense electrode nets that
help further constrain this solution, and conditionalizing the solution on other data such as
fMRI activations (Michel, et al., 2004).
Magnetoencephalography (MEG): MEG (for more information on MEG, see Lounasmaa,
Hamalainen, Hari, & Salmelin, 1996) measures fluctuations in the magnetic field at the
scalp that are caused by changes in neural activity. The source of this signal is similar to that
of EEG signals. Neuromagnetic fields have a strength of 50-500 fT, which is many orders of
magnitude smaller than the Earth's magnetic field (0.5 mT) or fluctuations due to noise in
the environment (1 nT – 1 μT). Detecting neuromagnetic signals therefore requires very
sensitive detectors called SQUIDs (superconducting quantum interference devices), as well
as sophisticated noise cancellation techniques. In a typical MEG setup, a fixed helmet
containing more than 100 detectors is placed on top of the subject's head.
The advantages and disadvantages of MEG can be compared to those of EEG. Like EEG,
MEG provides great temporal resolution (<1 ms), but poor spatial resolution. Solutions to
the inverse problem in MEG are somewhat more reliable and accurate, because the magnetic
permeability of the head is more uniform than its electrical conductivity, which greatly
simplifies the calculation of the MEG signal pattern produced by a given neural current
source (Lounasmaa, et al., 1996). On the downside, MEG equipment is much more
expensive than that used for EEG. MEG equipment is also not portable.
Near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS): NIRS (for more information on NIRS, see Gratton &
Fabiani, 2001; Hoshi, 2005) is another non-invasive imaging method that can be used in
humans. NIRS uses a light source and detector to measure the absorption and scatter of near-
infrared light by the skull and underlying tissue. In its most widely used form, NIRS detects
changes in absorption due to changes in oxygenated and deoxygenated hemoglobin, and
therefore is sensitive to the same kind of hemodynamic signals measured by BOLD fMRI.
There are also reports that NIRS can be sensitive to faster signals arising because of changes
in scatter associated with neuronal firing (Gratton & Fabiani, 2001), but these signals are
much weaker than the hemodynamic signals that are typically assessed (Obrig & Villringer,
2003).
Despite measuring a similar signal, NIRS provides much poorer spatial localization than
fMRI, and is restricted to measuring the dorsal cortical surface directly underneath the skull.
Recent technical developments are aimed at improving spatial localization, by using
different types of measurement (time- or frequency-resolved in addition to continuous wave)
or by using imaging techniques that combine multiple sources and detectors (Hoshi, 2005;
Obrig & Villringer, 2003). NIRS does have some advantages relative to fMRI, including
much higher temporal resolution, as well as specific measurements of both oxygenated and
deoxygenated hemoglobin. One of the biggest advantages of NIRS is that the measurement
devices are portable, unobtrusive and lower-cost. NIRS can therefore be used in populations
that cannot easily be scanned, such as infants and young children, claustrophobics and others
contraindicated for fMRI, and specific patient populations. It is also possible to construct
wearable NIRS systems that allow measurements while subjects move around (Hoshi,
2005).
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Anatomical imaging: The above methods all test for dynamic changes in regional neural
activity associated with the engagement of particular mental functions. There are also
techniques for testing for static differences in brain anatomy associated with differences in
mental function. These techniques test for associations across (rather than within) subjects,
using an individual differences approach. The relevant individual differences might be in the
structure (e.g., size, cortical thickness, or gray/white matter composition) of brain regions as
measured with anatomical MRI (Ashburner & Friston, 2000) or in the structure of white
matter tracts as measured with diffusion-tensor imaging (DTI) (Johansen-Berg &
Rushworth, 2009; Mori & Zhang, 2006).
Invasive recordings: In addition to the above non-invasive techniques, there are also rare
opportunities to measure neural activity more directly in the human brain (for more
information on invasive recordings, see Engel, Moll, Fried, & Ojemann, 2005). These
opportunities are only available in specific patient populations where invasive neural
recordings are already being performed as part of a clinical treatment. Examples include
patients with Parkinson's disease undergoing surgery to implant a deep brain stimulator, and
patients with epilepsy undergoing invasive monitoring and surgery to detect and remove
epileptic tissue. In such patients, neural recordings might occur acutely during surgery or
more chronically (over days) as part of monitoring. Obviously, since any research study is
secondary to the patient's treatment, these studies have many practical limitations. Also, by
definition, the subjects in these studies all have some kind of brain pathology, which could
limit generalizability of the data. Nevertheless, these studies provide a rare source of data
from the human brain that is comparable to that obtained in non-human animal models.
Multiple neurophysiological methods are used in these studies. During surgery, recordings
are usually performed with a single (or small number) of electrodes. Pre-surgical monitoring
can be performed with grids of multiple large electrodes (3-4 mm) placed on the cortical
surface, a technique referred to as electrocoticography (ECoG) (Miller, et al., 2007), or with
depth electrodes that penetrate deep into the brain, a technique referred to as stereotactic-
EEG (SEEG) (Lachaux, Rudrauf, & Kahane, 2003). Both of these techniques can record
oscillatory activity, at a greatly increased spatial precision and signal-to-noise compared to
non-invasive EEG/ERP. Depth electrodes can also record multi-unit activity and can be
adapted to include microwire extensions for recording single-unit activity or probes for
measuring neurotransmitter concentrations.
Tests of the necessity and sufficiency of brain regions for mental function
Lesion Studies: Perhaps the oldest technique in human neuroscience is the
neuropsychological approach, which examines how damage to the brain results in the
breakdown of mental function (for more information on lesion studies, see Kolb &
Whishaw, 2009; Rorden & Karnath, 2004; Shallice, 1988). This was the method of inquiry
in the classic studies of Paul Broca and Carl Wernicke, and reports of striking dissociations
after brain damage date back to the ancients (Benton, 1991).
Modern experiments might study brain damage arising from many different sources. Stroke
(ischemic or hemorrhagic) is most often studied, since it results in a relatively focal lesion.
Other sources of focal lesions include neurosurgery (i.e., tumor removal, temporal lobe
resection, corpus callosotomy) and penetrating head injury (Phineas Gage being a prominent
historical example). Anoxia can cause more diffuse but still localizable damage.
Degenerative diseases that cause more diffuse damage, such as frontotemporal dementia or
Alzheimer's disease, have also been studied (Grossman, et al., 2010). Investigators have also
studied Parkinson's disease to examine the effects of degeneration of the dopaminergic
system (Rutledge, et al., 2009; Shohamy, Myers, Grossman, Sage, & Gluck, 2005).
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Often, the neuropsychological approach has not been used for brain mapping at all, but
rather as a tool for dissecting the structure of the mind. In the tradition of cognitive
neuropsychology (Shallice, 1988), for example, the focus is on how a case illuminates the
organization of mental functions, rather than where the brain is damaged. Central to
cognitive neuropsychology is the search for dissociations. A single dissociation occurs when
an individual with brain damage exhibits a deficit in one task while performing at normal
levels in all others. Such dissociations are informative, but alone could be explained by tasks
being differentially sensitive to brain damage. A double dissociation occurs when one
individual exhibits a deficit on task A but not task B, while a second individual exhibits the
opposite, a deficit on task B but not task A. Double dissociations cannot be explained by
differential task sensitivity, and therefore suggest that the two tasks depend on partially
isolable mental processes.
Of course, the neuropsychological approach can also be used to address the question of what
brain structures are necessary for a particular mental function. Especially with the advent of
modern imaging techniques, neuropsychological studies have increasingly turned in this
direction. One approach is to perform group studies, where subjects are grouped according
to the location of their lesion, and the performance of different groups is compared (e.g.,
Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Fellows & Farah, 2007; Hsu, Bhatt, Adolphs,
Tranel, & Camerer, 2005). An alternative is to group subjects by their performance, and to
compare the overlap of lesions in subjects with and without deficits (e.g., Adolphs,
Damasio, Tranel, Cooper, & Damasio, 2000; Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1997). A
potential drawback to both of these methods is that they involve a binary classification of the
brain or behavioral data that overlooks any heterogeneity in lesion location or performance
(i.e., a subject is either in or out of a particular lesion group, a subject either does or does not
have a deficit). Methods such as voxel-lesion symptom mapping (VLSM) overcome these
drawbacks by treating both the brain and behavioral data as continuous measures (Kimberg,
Coslett, & Schwartz, 2007; Rorden, Karnath, & Bonilha, 2007).
The strength of lesion studies is the ability to perform tests of necessity in humans, to
examine whether loss of a brain region leads to loss of function. One aspect of lesion studies
that could limit inference is that the damage is not under experimental control, so it is
possible that the behavior in question is related to the person's premorbid personality or
medical condition rather than to the brain damage. In many cases, this is not a plausible
interpretation, but there are some examples – for one, an experimenter observing a deficit
after temporal lobe resection for epilepsy might worry whether the deficit was caused by the
epilepsy rather than the resection. Such concerns can be addressed by constructing the
appropriate comparison groups to rule out potential confounds. Other issues that limit
inference in lesion studies are: (1) cortical reorganization during recovery from stroke, so
that intact regions could be compensating for damaged ones in chronic patients; (2) great
variability across subjects, which can make it difficult to relate structure-to-function with
precision; and (3) the often severe nature of the damage, which can make it difficult to
examine the more subtle functions of a brain region. Finally, on the practical side,
conducting large-scale lesion studies requires an infrastructure for the recruitment, retention
and testing of subjects that, although probably less expensive than neuroimaging, is less
widely available (Fellows, Stark, Berg, & Chatterjee, 2008).
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS): TMS (for more information on TMS, see
Pascual-Leone, Walsh, & Rothwell, 2000; Walsh & Cowey, 2000) is based on Faraday's
principle of electromagnetic induction. A rapidly fluxing magnetic field is induced by
running an electrical current through the closed loop of the TMS coil. This magnetic field
traverses the scalp and skull, and induces an electrical current in the underlying neural
tissue. A typical setup uses a figure-eight shaped coil that induces a magnetic field of ∼2 T.
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The depth and width of the cortical area stimulated depends on the characteristics of the coil
and its placement, but a rough estimate is that the cortical area stimulated is ∼3 cm2 at a
depth of <2 cm. TMS therefore has a relatively focal spatial effect, but can only be used to
affect the dorsal cortical surface (although specialized coils that can reach deeper tissues are
being developed (Wagner, Valero-Cabre, & Pascual-Leone, 2007)). In a typical setup, a
stereotaxic system is used to track the location of the subject's head and the TMS coil, and in
conjunction with an anatomical scan of the subject's brain, to guide the precise placement of
the TMS coil with respect to cortical landmarks.
The electric current induced in neural tissue by TMS is strong enough to cause neural firing.
A single-pulse of TMS therefore disrupts neural processing by inducing a burst of non-
specific neural firing, which is then terminated by cortical inhibition (Siebner, et al., 2009).
Since the timecourse of this effect is ∼200 ms, single-pulse TMS has relatively good
temporal specificity. Single-pulse TMS can therefore be used to test the temporal window
within which disruption of cortical processing has an effect on behavior (Pascual-Leone, et
al., 2000; Walsh & Cowey, 2000).
Repeated pulses of TMS (rTMS) can also be administered. Here it is critical that users
remain within the established safety guidelines, since adverse effects of rTMS have been
reported outside this range (Wassermann, 1998). Short (<1 s), high frequency bursts can be
used if a temporal effect slightly longer than a single pulse is desired. Alternatively, longer
trains (∼10 min) of pulses can be administered. In this case, rTMS results in a prolonged (15
min -1 h) modulation of cortical excitability. Depending on the intensity and frequency of
stimulation, this modulation can either enhance or suppress cortical activity, although most
studies use low-frequency (< 1 Hz) parameters that result in suppression of cortical activity.
Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS): Like TMS, tDCS is a method for
noninvasive brain stimulation (for more information on tDCS, see Been, Ngo, Miller, &
Fitzgerald, 2007; Wagner, et al., 2007). Typically, a constant current (<2 mA) is applied to
the scalp through patch electrodes (25-35 cm2 area) for a time period of up to 20 minutes.
Depending on whether the anode or cathode is placed over the cortical region of interest,
tDCS either increases (anodal tDCS) or decreases (cathodal tDCS) neuronal excitability in a
region of the cortical surface beneath the electrode. These effects can persist for 15 min to 1
h after stimulation. In cognitive studies, a behavior task is performed either during or
directly after tDCS, and the effects of stimulation on behavior are examined. Sham
stimulation, where the current is ramped up and immediately back down rather than applied
continuously, can be used as a control condition.
The precise neuronal effects of TMS and tDCS likely differ, so they should not be
considered interchangeable techniques. Nevertheless, it is useful to compare the benefits and
drawbacks of the two methods. Similar to TMS, tDCS enables reversible activation and
inactivation studies in humans and is restricted to studies of the dorsal cortical surface
directly below the skull. In comparison to TMS, the equipment for tDCS is less expensive,
more portable, and more easily scalable to study a group of subjects at the same time. In
addition, no adverse effects of tDCS have been reported, beyond minor headaches or itching
beneath the electrode. TMS, however, permits greater spatial and temporal control of
stimulation, since it can be applied in single pulses and directed to more localized cortical
regions.
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Methods for linking neurochemical systems to mental function
Tests of association between neurochemical systems and mental function
PET: As discussed above, PET can be used to obtain measures of regional cerebral blood
flow or metabolism. PET can also be used to probe the function of neurotransmitter systems,
using radioactive tracers that bind specific neutrotransmitter receptors, transporters or
enzymes. For example, [11C] raclopride has been used to measure dopamine D2/D3
receptors (Zald, et al., 2004), while [18F] fluorodopa has been used to measure dopamine
synthesis (Cools, et al., 2009). The main limitation on what neurochemical processes can be
studied is in the development of appropriate radioactive ligands.
One way to employ these kinds of PET scans is to look for associations between subjects.
For example, individual differences in dopamine synthesis in the striatum have been related
to differences in reversal learning (Cools, et al., 2009). Another way to employ these kinds
of PET scans is to look for associations within subjects, across different tasks. For example,
[11C] raclopride has been used to measure changes in dopamine release under different task
conditions, by assuming that neurotransmitter released endogenously competes with the
radioactive tracer (Zald, et al., 2004; although see Egerton, et al., 2009, for several important
caveats to this technique).
Genetics: Many techniques are now available for linking genetic differences (genotypes) to
differences in behavior or brain function (phenotypes). Because most cognitive neuroscience
studies incorporating genetics have focused on polymorphisms affecting one or more
neurotransmitter systems, genetics is labeled here as a method for linking neurochemical
systems to mental function. It is important to remember, however, that this is only a small
portion of the possible genetic differences that could be studied.
Most cognitive neuroscience studies have used a candidate gene approach, in which a small
number of pre-identified genetic polymorphisms are tested (for more information on this
approach, see Green, et al., 2008). Some widely studied polymorphisms are in genes that
code for neurotransmitter receptors (e.g., the D2 or D4 dopamine receptors, the A2-
adrenergic receptor), neurotransmitter transporters (e.g., the dopamine, norepinephrine,
serotonin or acetylcholine transporters), enzymes involved in neurotransmitter synthesis
(e.g., dopamine beta-hydroxylase, tryptophan hydroxylase), enzymes involved in the
breakdown of neurotransmitters (e.g., catechol-O-methyltransferase, monamine oxidase),
and proteins involved in neurotransmitter receptor signaling cascades (e.g., DARPP32
protein). Usually, but not always, there is already molecular biological evidence that the
genetic difference studied results in changes in the function of the associated protein (i.e.,
the protein is more or less efficient or is expressed to a greater or lesser degree). In these
studies, genetic material is obtained from saliva or blood samples, and each subject's
genotype for the candidate gene is determined. Then behavioral performance (or neural
activity) is correlated with genotype. Since genotype is not manipulated by the
experimenter, these should be considered tests of association. These are also between
subjects rather than within subject associations.
Although most published studies in cognitive neuroscience have used the candidate gene
approach, the most recent and advanced genetic technologies allow for much larger studies.
These range from using gene chips to examine hundreds of polymorphisms at a time, to
performing genome-wide association studies (Manolio, 2010). In the latter case, the entire
genome is scanned for loci associated with a particular phenotype. These larger-scale studies
require a greater infrastructure of people and technology.
There are several complexities to keep in mind regarding genetic studies (Green, et al.,
2008). Most (if not all) behaviors are affected by many genes (polygenicity), so the effect of
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any one gene on the phenotype of interest is likely to be very small. Also, a given
polymorphism is likely to have effects on multiple phenotypes (pleiotropy). Further, there
could be interactions between different polymorphisms, including interactions between
different polymorphisms within the same gene. Finally, these genetic differences are present
throughout the lifespan, so they may exert effects through developmental or compensatory
changes, and interactions between the gene and the environment are likely to play an
important role.
Tests of necessity and sufficiency of neurochemical systems for mental
function
Pharmacology: Pharmacological interventions can be used to test the necessity and
sufficiency of neurochemical systems for mental processes (for more information on this
approach, see Robbins & Arnsten, 2009). These studies involve administering a drug that
blocks (an antagonist) or stimulates (an agonist) a particular kind of neurotransmitter
receptor, and comparing behavioral performance on and off the drug.
A main limiting factor to these studies is the existence of a drug that modulates the system
of interest and can be safely administered to drug-naïve subjects. Another practical
limitation is the possible need for a physician's oversight. Theoretical interpretation of these
studies should take into account that: (1) drugs act at many locations in the brain (and body)
simultaneously, and these effects may interact, (2) most drugs are not perfectly specific and
can have effects at multiple sites (e.g., multiple receptor subtypes), and (3) the same drug
can have different and sometimes opposing effects at different doses.
In addition to manipulating neurotransmitter systems pharmacologically, there are also
methods for increasing or decreasing the basal levels of serotonin and dopamine/
norepinephrine (Mendelsohn, Riedel, & Sambeth, 2009; Silber & Schmitt). These methods
involve dietary manipulations that overload or deplete tryptophan (the metabolic precursor
of serotonin), or that overload or deplete phenyalanine and tyrosine (the metabolic
precursors of dopamine and norepinpehrine).
Methods that monitor peripheral nervous system activity
So far, this review has focused on methods that link mental functions to regional brain
activity or to the action of diffuse neurochemical systems. Several other methods in the
neuroeconomist's toolkit do not fit into these two categories, but can be broadly
characterized as measurements of peripheral nervous system activity. This includes indirect
indices of autonomic (sympathetic/parasympathetic) activity, such as measurements of heart
rate, blood pressure, respiration rate, pupil diameter, and galvanic skin response. These
measurements have shown associations with arousal, learning, and decision making
(Satterthwaite, et al., 2007), and are also particularly useful in studies of emotion (Olsson &
Phelps, 2007). Other measures, such as eye tracking or facial electromyography (EMG),
index peripheral somatomotor activity. Eye tracking can provide information about attention
and information processing (Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010), while facial EMG can
indicate the presence of different emotions (Halberstadt, Winkielman, Niedenthal, & Dalle,
2009). All of these techniques can provide important data for neuroeconomic studies.
Combining methods
The functional organization of this methods overview stresses how different methods
provide different kinds of inference, and therefore highlights what can be gained by studying
the same decision paradigm with multiple different methods. Many of these gains occur
even when the different methods are used in separate studies. In some cases, though, the
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simultaneous use of two different methods enables one to ask novel questions that could not
be answered with one technique alone or with the two techniques used at separate times.
Some good examples involve the simultaneous combination of fMRI with another method.
Simultaneous EEG and fMRI allows one to look for BOLD activity that varies on a trial-by-
trial basis with the amplitude or timing of an event-related potential, providing a stronger
way to link data from the two methods (Debener, et al., 2006). Simultaneous TMS and fMRI
can map the functional interactions between brain regions, by testing how brain regions
distant from the target respond to TMS pulses, or by testing how distant regions compensate
during task performance when the targeted region is depressed (Siebner, et al., 2009).
Combining fMRI with genetics can identify intermediate phenotypes—neural responses that
vary with genotype and that might prove more reliable than behavioral phenotypes (Canli &
Lesch, 2007; Green, et al., 2008; Hariri, Drabant, & Weinberger, 2006). Combining fMRI
with pharmacology can allow one to better pinpoint the location of any pharmacological
effects (Leslie & James, 2000; Shah & Marsden, 2004). Finally, peripheral measures can be
combined with fMRI to study the central correlates of peripheral effects (Gray, et al., 2009).
Is research in neureconomics using a multi-method approach?
A natural follow-up question to this overview of cognitive neuroscience techniques is,
“Which methods are most neuroeconomists using?” Furthermore, given that the strongest
inferences regarding brain-behavior relationships require converging evidence from tests of
association, necessity and sufficiency, does research in neuroeconomics actually employ this
approach? This is an important question in assessing neuroeconomics at this early stage of
the field's development. Most introductions to the field stress the benefits of employing
multiple methodologies (Camerer, 2007; Camerer, et al., 2004; Camerer, et al., 2005).
Furthermore, proponents of neuroeconomics point to this multi-method approach in
defending the field from its critics, criticizing detractors for failing to recognize that claims
in neuroeconomics are based on more than just functional imaging results (Camerer, 2008).
But does this description coincide with what most neuroeconomists are actually doing?
To get a sense of what methods are being used in neuroeconomics research, we can examine
two sources of data. The first textbook for the field, Neuroeconomics: Decision-making and
the Brain (Glimcher, Camerer, Fehr, & Poldrack, 2009), provides one source of data. The
references for this volume presumably contain the most influential early research in
neuroeconomics. What do these references show about what methods are being used? Of the
total number of references (1744), a minority (260) were research articles that collected
neuroscience data in human subjects. Other references were reviews (256), theoretical
papers (220), papers using non-human subjects (438), or papers concerning behavioral
phenomena in human subjects (254). We can classify the human neuroscience papers
according to method used, excluding a subset that had primarily clinical aims (e.g.,
anatomical or functional imaging to identify differences between patients and controls). By
far most (70.0%) of the human neuroscience papers used fMRI. The second largest group
(9.6%) studied subjects with brain damage. Overall, 81.7% of the cited human neuroscience
papers provided tests of association, 12.5% tests of necessity, 2.1% tests of sufficiency, and
3.8% a combination of these (see Figure 1).
A second source of data is the abstracts from the Society for Neuroeconomics conferences in
the five-year window, 2005-2009
(http://www.neuroeconomics.org/conference/annual-conference). Here close to 60% of the
total number of abstracts reported neuroscience studies in human subjects (200/344), with
the remainder composed of behavioral studies in human subjects (60), studies using
theoretical or computational approaches (26), and studies using non-human subjects (58).
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Again we can classify the human neuroscience abstracts according to method used,
excluding a small number that had primarily clinical aims. Here the predominance of fMRI
was even more pronounced: 85.3% of the abstracts used fMRI, with no other method
represented in more than 3% of the abstracts. Accordingly, 93.4% of the human
neuroscience abstracts provided tests of association, 2.5% tests of necessity, 1.5% tests of
sufficiency, and 2.5% a combination of these (see Figure 1).
These data illustrate a bias towards using test of association, and particularly fMRI. But how
significant is this bias? One comparison point is the field of cognitive neuroscience as a
whole. Fellows and colleagues note that publications using functional imaging increased
dramatically after the development of fMRI and began to outnumber those using lesion
methods between 1997 and 2001 (Fellows, et al., 2005). In the editorial accompanying the
Fellows paper, Chatterjee identifies a wider gap in 2005 when consulting abstracts for the
Cognitive Neuroscience Society meeting (Chatterjee, 2005). Those data show a ratio of
about six-to-one between studies using functional imaging (fMRI, PET, ERPs) and those
using the lesion method or TMS. The bias towards tests of association in the
Neuroeconomics references is of roughly the same size, while that in the conference
abstracts is much larger.iv In terms of gathering converging evidence from multiple
methods, it appears neuroeconomics is certainly not doing better than field of cognitive
neuroscience as a whole, and may be doing much worse.
It is important to recognize that there are several strong theoretical reasons to rely heavily on
fMRI. There are few techniques that test necessity and sufficiency, and each has significant
limitations. As a test of association, fMRI has several important strengths. It is currently
unparalleled in the ability to image the entire human brain at high spatial resolution.
Researchers have also developed several advanced fMRI design and analysis techniques,
which allow one to ask questions that are much more sophisticated than mere localization.
This includes repetition suppression designs, model-based fMRI analyses, pattern
classification methods, and functional and effective connectivity techniques. All of these go
beyond asking whether there is an association between increased neural activity in brain
area X and psychological process Y, to investigate the relationship between the pattern of
neural activity within and across regions and the pattern of instantiations of the
psychological process.
There are also practical concerns contributing to the heavy reliance on fMRI. Most research
institutions now have an MRI scanner, and user-friendly software is readily available for the
analysis of fMRI data. There are very few barriers to beginning fMRI research, even though
fMRI is more expensive and technically challenging than many of the other methodologies
in human neuroscience. As one important contrast, access to subjects with brain damage has
historically been limited to clinicians and their collaborators, even though in principle
creating the support structure for patient-based research would require (at most) comparable
resources to establishing an imaging center.
An important question for neuroeconomists is whether we should reduce some of the
practical barriers to using methods other than fMRI, or otherwise encourage a greater degree
of multi-method research. There are several reasons for doing so. A stated standard of the
field is that claims should be defended with evidence gathered using multiple methodologies
ivThere are several potential explanations for the differences between the citations and conference abstracts data. One possible
explanation is that the two datasets differ because they sample different time periods. This explanation can be ruled out, because
restricting the citations data to 2005-2009 does not dramatically change the overall percentages (association - 81.1%, necessity -
13.5%, sufficiency - 1.8%, combined - 3.6%). Other possible explanations include that the one source of data is more representative of
the field as a whole, or that, compared to studies using other methods, fMRI studies have a greater chance of not being published and/
or not being cited.
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(Camerer, 2008). Furthermore, as discussed above, the strongest arguments in neuroscience
rely on converging data that speak not just to association, but also to necessity and
sufficiency. To the extent that researchers in the field want findings in neuroeconomics to
have similar impact, they should follow the same approach.
How can neuroscience methods be used to inform theories in economics
and psychology?
Many economists are skeptical that research incorporating neuroscience methods can better
inform theories in economics (Camerer, 2007; Camerer, et al., 2004; Camerer, et al., 2005).
They argue that a better understanding of the neural mechanisms of decision making will not
necessarily lead to better predictions about economic behavior. This critique is similar to
earlier critiques of cognitive neuroscience (Coltheart, 2004). As cognitive psychologists
have said, “Why should we study the brain in order to understand the mind?” This is an
important debate, and many neuroeconomists have outlined how research in the field can
inform economics and psychology as well as neuroscience (Camerer, 2007; Glimcher, 2010;
McCabe, 2008). Many neuroeconomists believe that a multi-level investigation of brain-
behavior relationships, aimed at building mechanistic theories of decision making, will
ultimately lead to a coherent integration at the border of neuroscience and economics/
psychology (Glimcher, 2010; Kable & Glimcher, 2009). While some scholars of decision
making may doubt this possibility, a similar integration has already occurred in perception,
and arguably in other domains of cognitive psychology (language, memory) as well.
Setting aside the prospects for a broad integration, we can consider specific ways that the
neuroscience methodologies reviewed above can be used to inform research questions in
economics and psychology. As most of the research in the field has used fMRI, the
examples discussed here reference that technique, but could apply similarly to other tests of
association. One place to start, though, is to note one way that fMRI data are (commonly)
used that provides poor inference regarding psychological processes. This involves making
an assumption about the function of brain region based on past studies, and inferring based
on activation in that region that the task the subject performed involved a particular
psychological process. For example, one might find that decisions under risk are associated
with activity in the amygdala, note that the amygdala has previously been implicated in the
emotion of fear, and then conclude that decisions under risk involved fear. This kind of
reasoning is called “reverse inference,” and reverse inference is generally problematic
(Aguirre & D'Esposito, 1999; Poldrack, 2006). The central problem is that it assumes there
is only one psychological process associated with activity in a given brain region (e.g., the
amygdala is only active when you experience fear). Such a one-to-one mapping is unlikely.
Poldrack works through an example in probabilistic terms to show that reverse inferences
are unlikely to provide very strong information, at least at the spatial scale of brain activity
and coarseness of the cognitive ontology that are typically used (Poldrack, 2006; though see
Ariely & Berns, 2010, for a more promising example).
There are several more promising ways, though, that fMRI (and other tests of association)
might be used to inform economic and psychological theories. First, model-based fMRI can
provide information about what variables and quantities are encoded in the brain when an
individual makes decisions. One example of this is the demonstration of prediction error
signals in the human brain, consistent with those posited in reinforcement learning models
(McClure, Berns, & Montague, 2003; O'Doherty, Dayan, Friston, Critchley, & Dolan,
2003). Current work is using these signals to test competing learning models (Hampton,
Bossaerts, & O'Doherty, 2006). Another example is the demonstration of utility-like value
signals during human choice (Kable & Glimcher, 2007; Plassmann, O'Doherty, & Rangel,
2007; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007), consistent with those posited in decision theory.
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Current work is illuminating the inputs to those signals and the domains in which they
operate (Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009; Smith, et al., 2010; Wunderlich, Rangel, &
O'Doherty, 2009). Second, fMRI can demonstrate whether two different kinds of decisions
use similar or different neural processes, and thus whether they are likely to use similar or
different cognitive processes. Examples include prominent debates in the field over whether
decisions under risk and ambiguity involve similar or different mechanisms (Hsu, et al.,
2005; Levy, Snell, Nelson, Rustichini, & Glimcher, 2010), and whether decisions about
immediate and delayed rewards involve similar or different mechanisms (Kable &
Glimcher, 2007; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). Third, in addition to
identifying similarities and differences across tasks, fMRI can also be used to test whether
different individuals perform the same decision in different ways. Venkrataman and
colleagues provide one example of this with regards to decision strategy (Venkatraman,
Payne, Bettman, Luce, & Huettel, 2009), and Houser and colleagues discuss how the
discovery and validation of different types of decision makers could improve econometric
predictions (Houser, Schunk, & Xiao, 2007). Fourth and finally, directly incorporating
neural measures into models could improve predictions of economic behavior. Early
neuroeconomic studies demonstrated that neural activity could be used to predict
simultaneously measured choices (Knutson, Rick, Wimmer, Prelec, & Loewenstein, 2007).
More recent studies have shown how neural activity can predict individual behavior outside
of the scanner (Levy, Lazzaro, Rutledge, & Glimcher, 2011), and how neural measures can
predict what products will be successful (Berns, Capra, Moore, & Noussair, 2009).
Because it is the most widely used technique in the field, this discussion has so far focused
on fMRI. However, considering how neuroscience methods can best inform theories in
economics and psychology provides yet another rationale for a multi-method approach. In
tests of necessity and sufficiency, behavior is the dependent variable. Since this is also the
variable economists and psychologists are usually most interested in, these techniques could
provide more compelling evidence to them. Consider the question of whether two kinds of
decisions involve similar or different cognitive processes. The search for double
dissociations in neuropsychology is entirely motivated by these kinds of concerns. Though
this may not be how they are commonly used, TMS, tDCS, and pharmacology can uncover
similar dissociations. Indeed the question “Why should we study the brain in order to
understand the mind?” might have seemed strange to earlier human neuroscientists. For
more than a hundred years before the advent of modern imaging techniques, human
neuropsychologists studied the effects of brain damage in order to elucidate mental
structure. In addition to providing evidence about the causal role of brain structures in
behavior, tests of necessity and sufficiency, since they treat behavior as the dependent
variable, can also provide evidence that further strengthens the neuroeconomist's answer to
why studying the brain enlightens us about how people make decisions.
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Percentage of studies in the field of neuroeconomics that use tests of association, necessity
and sufficiency. (a) Data from articles cited in the textbook Neuroeconomics: Decision
Making and the Brain (Glimcher, et al., 2009).v (b) Data from abstracts presented at the
Society for Neuroeconomics conference.vi
vFrom the articles cited in Neuroeconomics, the tests of association included fMRI (168), PET measuring blood flow (17), EEG (2),
anatomical studies (3), invasive recordings (1), PET measuring neurotransmitter receptors (4), and genetics (1). The tests of necessity
included lesion or patient studies (23), TMS (4), cathodal tDCS (1), and antagonist pharmacology (2). The tests of sufficiency
included anodal tDCS (2) and agonist pharmacology (3). Combinations included neuroimaging studies in subjects with brain damage
(5) and neuroimaging combined with pharmacology (4).
viFrom the Society for Neuroeconomics abstracts, the tests of association included fMRI (168), PET (1), EEG (5), NIRS (1),
anatomical studies (1), invasive recordings (2), hormone measurements (1), and genetics (5). The tests of necessity included lesion or
patient studies (3) and TMS (2). The tests of sufficiency included agonist pharmacology (3). Combinations included neuroimaging
studies in subjects with brain damage (2), neuroimaging combined with pharmacology (2), and patient studies combined with
pharmacology (1).
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